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Introduction 
This paper describes some of the key lessons from the management of safety in safety-
critical industries, which might be applied in healthcare in order to improve the safety of care 
delivered to patients.  Certain safety-critical industries, such as civil aviation and the nuclear 
industry, suffer very few accidents. Such domains are sometimes referred to as ultra-safe 
systems [1].  What do these industries do that enables them to remain near accident free for 
significant periods of time?   
 
Arguably, many factors contribute to the success of ultra-safe systems.  However, looking 
across safety-critical industries it is possible to identify a number of core safety management 
practices that are accepted and expected:  the proactive identification and management of 
risk, the demonstration and critique of an organisation’s safety position (i.e. why do we 
believe the organisation is safe?), and the commitment to continuous organisational 
learning.  
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The aim of this paper is to provide a brief overview of these safety management practices, 
and to describe lessons for the management of patient safety in healthcare organisations.  
The transfer of lessons from safety-critical industries to healthcare can often be challenging 
in practice [2-4].  When transferring and applying lessons from industry to healthcare it is 
important to understand the underlying theory, the benefits and the limitations of tools and 
methods within their original industrial context [5].   
 
The next section looks at how safety-critical industries proactively seek out and manage risk.  
Then, the concept of safety cases is described.  This concept is useful to make an 
organisation’s risk position explicit.  Subsequently, the importance of establishing strategies 
to promote organisational learning is discussed.  A summary of the key lessons for 
healthcare concludes the paper.        
 
Paper Objectives 
• Provide an overview of successful safety management practices in safety-critical 
industries 
• Introduce principles of proactive risk management 
• Outline the use of safety cases to demonstrate and critique an organisation’s safety 
position   
• Discuss the role of organisational learning for sustaining progress with safety  
• Describe lessons for managing patient safety in healthcare organisations 
 
Proactive Risk Management 
A defining characteristic of successful safety-critical industries is that organisations seek out 
and manage safety risks proactively [6].  It is useful to distinguish and discuss separately the 
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concept of risk, methods to assess risk, and the organisational strategies and processes for 
managing risk, as these are separate albeit interrelated issues.   
     
The risk concept 
Concepts of risk aim to model or to represent that an activity could in the future lead to some 
kind of consequences or outcomes that are not desired.  The concept of risk has been 
discussed from different perspectives in the literature, and to date there is no agreed 
definition of risk [7].  Aven [7] and Althaus [8] give interesting overviews of the historical 
development of different conceptions of risk.      
 
In healthcare it is common to talk about the risk of developing a specific type of disease or 
condition, e.g. diabetes risk, and to identify related risk factors that increase the risk.  Risk in 
this interpretation represents a probability.  From an engineering perspective, risk is often 
regarded as the combination of the probability of an event developing and the severity of the 
resulting consequences.  Including consideration of the consequences is important because 
an event (e.g. failure of a brake) can have outcomes of different severity (e.g. negligible 
injury to fatality).  The ISO 31000 standard on Risk Management defines risk as “effect of 
uncertainty on objectives”.  This somewhat cryptic definition incorporates the notion of 
uncertainty, which in effect separates the risk concept from the measurement of risk.  The 
earlier engineering perspective proposed probability and severity as both definition and 
measurement of risk.  The ISO 31000 and other more recent definitions define risk through 
uncertainty related to activities and consequences, but leave the measurement open [9].  
This is important because analysts typically make a number of assumptions or rely on 
background knowledge when assessing risk.  These assumptions and background 
knowledge can be strong or not so strong, i.e. they have associated uncertainties.  These 
uncertainties can have a significant impact on the assessment of risk, but are not usually 
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captured in the engineering perspective based on probabilities [9].  For example, consider a 
hazard involving the failure of an automatic train protection system (automatic braking 
system).  Engineers might estimate the failure probability p and the severity of the 
consequences c.  However, the train protection system might be a radically new design, and 
there might be only limited testing evidence available, which was collected under idealised 
conditions in a laboratory.  Therefore, the existing knowledge to support the value of p would 
be weak.  The failure probability p does not provide any indication of the uncertainty that is 
associated with its value.  A possible way to deal with this problem is to articulate the 
assumptions and their relative strengths separately from the risk assessment, for example in 
the form of a safety case [10] (see below).         
 
Other perspectives on risk emphasise the dynamic and social dimensions of risk [8, 11, 12].  
Such approaches might be of particular relevance for healthcare, because the patient has a 
unique perspective on risk, which is shaped by their own history, experience, and 
expectations.  It has been suggested that in a healthcare context, risk might be understood 
as something personal that is negotiated between the patient and healthcare professionals 
[13].         
 
Risk assessment 
The above discussion illustrated that the concept of risk and the process of assessing risk 
are two different things.  How one assesses risk is influenced by the risk concept adopted, 
but which concept is the most appropriate will depend on the specific situation.   
 
In UK safety-critical industries, the most common approach for risk assessment is to 
describe risk qualitatively and quantitatively (as required), and to document relevant 
uncertainties in a safety case.  Risk assessment usually entails hazard analysis to identify 
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and to describe scenarios of interest, and risk analysis to describe and to evaluate the risks 
associated with the identified hazards.  These steps can be supported by a large number of 
specific methods, such as Failure Mode & Effects Analysis (FMEA) and the extension 
Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) [14], Hazards and Operability Studies 
(Hazop) [15], Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and Event Tree Analysis (ETA) [16], and more 
recent methods such as Functional Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM) [17] and System-
Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) [18]. 
 
Risks are often assessed qualitatively first, informed by engineering judgement and gut 
feelings.  This type of qualitative analysis is considered sufficient in many cases [19].  In 
situations where this qualitative analysis suggests that risks might be high or the 
consequences severe, quantitative analysis might be carried out.  Quantitative analysis is 
more common for engineering problems than for organisational changes, because such 
changes are more difficult to model and the uncertainties associated with quantitative 
estimates can be very high.     
 
Common to all of the different approaches for risk assessment is the proactive search for 
threats and vulnerabilities.  In proactive approaches the emphasis shifts from historic event 
and outcome data (i.e. adverse events) towards consideration of future events (i.e. risk).  
Regulatory requirements (e.g. [19]) act as a strong motivator, but there are also ethical and 
societal considerations.  In addition, organisations are increasingly aware of the potentially 
negative impact of poor safety performance on the reputation of a business or company [6].    
 
Risk management  
Managing risk is more than describing and assessing risks.  Managers have to make 
decisions about whether or not risks are acceptable, and whether to invest money in order to 
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reduce risk.  Crucially, as the risk management process proceeds from risk analysis towards 
risk-informed decision-making, judgements about risk tend to be less based on purely factual 
evidence and more based on value assessments instead [20].  Value-based judgements 
might include considerations other than safety, such as production benefits and other 
business impacts, ethical concerns, issues of corporate responsibility, and whether or not a 
decision might hold up in court [6].       
 
In the UK context, the Health & Safety Executive (HSE) has provided guidance about risk 
management, which is applied widely [19].  The guidance includes the requirement that 
operators of systems demonstrate that risks have been reduced as low as reasonably 
practicable (ALARP).  This requirement is used to ensure that risks have been controlled 
effectively up to a point where further risk reduction would result in disproportionate cost.  In 
practice, making such judgements can be difficult, and practical problems with this concept 
have been highlighted [21].  Even so, the guidance acts as a motivator to businesses to 
manage risks proactively and transparently.       
 
Patient safety risk management 
The management of risks to patient safety is still predominantly reactive [22].  Common tools 
for risk management include Root Cause Analysis (RCA) and incident reporting.  These 
approaches look at adverse events and incidents, trying to identify factors that contributed 
specifically to these events, so that remedial action can be undertaken.  While useful 
information can be generated in this way, the downside is that these approaches are 
reactive, i.e. they usually only look at events that have already caused harm.   
 
Increasingly, organisations are encouraged to adopt proactive risk management 
approaches.  FMEA has been proposed frequently as a potential tool for use in healthcare 
Sujan, M. Safety Management in High-Risk Industries – Lessons for Patient Safety.   
University of Warwick, 2018 
 7 
contexts.  In particular the Veterans’ Affairs (VA) in the US has been promoting this 
approach, and a healthcare-specific version has been developed – Healthcare Failure Mode 
& Effects Analysis [23].  FMEA has been used in different settings [24-27].  Often 
participants have described the experiences of using FMEA positively, but there has been 
criticism of the approach [28, 29].  It has been suggested that FMEA is unduly time 
consuming, and that the risk assessments produced using FMEA were dependent on the 
participants and not necessarily replicable.  One can add to these criticisms that knowledge 
of FMEA and other proactive methods for risk analysis is still limited in many healthcare 
organisations, and that such approaches are used only infrequently.       
 
Safety Cases – Demonstrating and Critiquing the Safety Position 
The concept of a safety case 
The HSE in the UK requires that manufacturers and operators of safety-critical systems 
demonstrate that they have adopted a thorough and systematic process for understanding 
proactively the risks associated with their systems, and that these risks have been controlled 
appropriately.  The regulator does not specify how risks should be dealt with specifically, but 
rather sets goals that have to be achieved (e.g. all risks have to be reduced ALARP).  It is 
then left to the manufacturers and operators of systems to argue that they have met these 
goals.   
 
In the UK, these duties are often fulfilled through the use of safety cases [30].  The purpose 
of a safety case can be described as providing a structured argument, supported by a body 
of evidence that provides a compelling, comprehensible and valid case that a system is 
acceptably safe for a given application in a given context [31].  A key component of any 
safety case is a risk-based argument and corresponding evidence.  This is intended to 
demonstrate that all risks associated with a particular system have been identified, that 
Sujan, M. Safety Management in High-Risk Industries – Lessons for Patient Safety.   
University of Warwick, 2018 
 8 
appropriate risk controls have been put in place, and that there are appropriate processes in 
place to monitor the effectiveness of the risk controls and the safety performance of the 
system on an on-going basis.  The argument and evidence in safety cases are then 
examined and challenged, typically by independent safety assessors, as part of the overall 
safety assessment or certification process.  
 
As mentioned above, the safety case can usefully document assumptions and uncertainties.  
Increasingly, best practice is to include a “confidence argument” to complement the risk-
based argument [32].  This confidence argument outlines the strength of the evidence, and 
the extent to which one can place confidence in the safety case.  In practice, safety case 
assessors tend to challenge issues of qualitative nature (i.e. assumptions, boundaries of the 
system, excluded scenarios etc.) rather than specific numerical values.   
 
Using safety cases in healthcare 
There has been some recent interest in the application of safety cases in healthcare [10, 33].  
However, this interest is limited at present to medical devices and to health informatics 
applications [34-36].  In the US, the FDA has issues guidance for assurance cases (a type of 
safety case) for infusion pumps that are certified via the 510(k) route.  In the UK, NHS Digital 
has published standards for both manufacturers and users of health IT products, which 
include a requirement for the development of a clinical safety case.  There is very limited 
empirical evidence available about the use of safety cases in healthcare, in particular at the 
system or the service level [22].   
 
The regulatory environment acts as a key driver for the use of safety cases in UK industries 
[10].  In the NHS, and probably in healthcare more generally, there is no single body to 
provide centralised and coordinated oversight of patient safety [37].  There are around 20 
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regulatory bodies in health and social care in England, and this diversity has contributed to a 
lack of a coherent push for improving patient safety [38].  In addition, regulatory bodies 
require the necessary technical understanding and adequate resources in order to make a 
safety case approach work in practice.   
 
In the absence of a regulatory push for safety cases, organisations might still consider using 
safety cases to make their risk position explicit.  This requires adaptations to the safety case 
concept, moving it from a regulatory tool towards a tool for effective risk management.  This 
is in line with observations and suggestions by both the Cullen inquiry (following the Piper 
Alpha oil platform explosion) [39] and the Haddon-Cave report (following the loss of a Royal 
Air Force aircraft in Afghanistan) [21].  Lord Cullen’s report argues that safety cases should 
first and foremost provide assurance to companies themselves that they have followed a 
systematic and thorough approach to risk management to ensure that their systems are 
safe.  Similarly, while the Haddon-Cave report criticises the Ministry of Defence and BAE 
Systems for their safety culture and attitudes, the report suggests that safety cases remain 
central to making an organisation’s risk position explicit so that it can be reviewed and 
critiqued.      
 
Organisational Learning  
The third safety management practice, which successful organisations pursue, is 
organisational learning.  Organisational learning can be characterised as a continuous cycle 
of action and reflection [40].  Organisations might be more successful at learning from past 
experience if they create and foster the capacity for deep reflection on whole system 
dynamics, which can lead to fundamental change [41].  On the other hand, insistence on 
past traditions, and quick fixes to existing strategies and procedures might inhibit more 
powerful forms of organisational learning.  Organisations have a range of learning processes 
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at their disposal, which might be internal (for example audits and adverse event reviews) as 
well as external (for example feedback from the regulator) [42].   
 
Many organisations are relying on incident reporting systems as a key process for reporting 
and organisational learning [43-45].  Ideally, effective learning from incidents triggers 
improvements in practice that enhance safety and productivity [46].  The analysis of 
incidents seeks to reveal contributory factors and underlying causes [43], which can then be 
addressed in order to reduce the likelihood of incidents recurring.  Learning from past 
experiences does not have to be limited to the consideration of incidents, but can also 
include monitoring and analysis of leading indicators, or even weak signals [47].  However, 
there is increasing evidence in the literature that suggests that effective learning from past 
experiences in order to improve safety performance remains challenging even in traditional 
safety-critical industries [44, 46, 48].     
 
The challenges of organisational learning in healthcare 
Following the public inquiry into the failings at Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust, the 
subsequent Berwick report generated lessons and suggestions for change for the UK 
government and the National Health Service (NHS) in England [49].  The report 
recommends that the NHS should aim to become a system devoted to continuous learning 
and improvement of patient care.  This is clearly a fundamental requirement for any 
healthcare organisation aspiring to improve the safety of care to higher levels.   
 
Incident reporting as an instrument for organisational learning was introduced into the NHS 
about 2003, following a publication by the Department of Health [50].  This report 
recommended the development of a reporting system based on the model of incident 
reporting used in commercial aviation.  Incident reporting is well established in the NHS, and 
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it is regarded as a key instrument for improving patient safety and the quality of services [51, 
52].    
 
In one respect, incident reporting in the NHS has been very successful.  There are a 
staggering number of incidents reported every year.  However, despite the large number of 
potential learning opportunities, questions have been raised about the effectiveness of 
incident reporting systems to contribute to improvements in patient safety [53-57].  There are 
now many studies that document barriers to effective incident reporting in health care.  Such 
barriers include, for example, fear of blame and repercussions, poor usability of incident 
reporting systems, perceptions among doctors that incident reporting is a nursing process, 
lack of feedback to staff who report incidents, and lack of visible improvements to the local 
work environment as a result of reported incidents [55, 56, 58-61].  Among management 
staff in particular, there continues to be widespread misperception that incident reporting 
systems might be useful for monitoring incident frequencies, despite evidence that suggests 
that incident reporting data are poor indicators of actual incident frequencies [62].  It has 
been suggested that the focus of learning from incidents in health care has been too much 
on collecting and categorising data [56, 63], whereas successful learning from experience 
should inherently be a social and participative process [46, 56]. 
 
Learning from the ordinary 
How can health care organisations enhance their ability to learn from past experience in 
order to set them on the path towards becoming ultra-safe organisations given the obstacles 
and practical difficulties with learning from incidents outlined above?  One way might be to 
shift the focus from formal learning about extraordinary failures and incidents towards more 
de-centralised, local forms of learning about everyday clinical work [64].   
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An example of such a local form of learning is the Proactive Risk Monitoring in Healthcare 
(PRIMO) approach.  This approach to organisational learning was developed in order to elicit 
a rich contextual picture of the local work environment, to move away from negative and 
threatening notions of errors and mistakes, and to encourage active participation and 
ownership with clear feedback for local work practices [60, 61]. The distinguishing feature of 
the PRIMO approach is that it focuses on learning from the ordinary, in this case the various 
hassles that practitioners experience in their everyday clinical work.   
 
Hassle in this instance can be defined loosely as anything that causes people problems 
during their daily work. Examples of hassle include, for instance, unavailable equipment 
such as drip stands on a ward or supporting equipment for undertaking radiographic 
procedures. There are a number of important benefits of learning from everyday hassle. 
Among these the most important benefit is arguably that the focus on hassle supports 
building an understanding of the system dynamics, i.e., of the way performance adjustments 
are made, and the way work ordinarily unfolds. Reports of hassle typically contain not only 
descriptions of how the hassle manifested itself, but also how people coped – how they 
adapted their behaviour in order to continue to provide safe and good quality care [65]. 
Examples of typical adaptations made by health care professionals include the sharing of 
information and personal negotiation to create a shared awareness, prioritisation of goals 
and of activities, and offering and seeking help.  
 
Other local and informal processes that organisations might consider supporting include 
regular staff meetings aimed at identifying ways to improve the delivery of care, informal 
discussions between staff and their managers, and discussions among peers, and informal 
lunchtime improvement groups.  Such processes are perceived as locally owned, and they 
might be better suited to provide shared awareness, to make staff feel that they are being 
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listened to and that they can make a contribution to improving patient safety, and for 
generating ownership for improvement interventions [64].   
 
Research suggests that where organisational effort is invested to support and include such 
processes, these can have a positive effect on staff engagement in reporting and learning 
activities [60] and on patient safety [66].  Utilising a range of processes that draw upon and 
strengthen different aspects of an organisation’s culture might enable healthcare 
organisations to deliver more sustainable improvements in patient safety [67]. 
 
Summary 
This paper discussed three key strategies that successful safety-critical industries adopt in 
order to achieve outstanding safety performance: the proactive management of risk, the 
explicit demonstration and critique of the organisation’s safety position, and a commitment to 
continuous learning and improvement.   
 
In principle, these strategies can work across different industries, and they have the potential 
to transform radically the safety record of healthcare organisations.  However, healthcare is 
unlike other safety-critical industries in many aspects, and the different cultural and 
contextual background has to be considered.  None the less, these lessons from industry 
should provide valuable input to patient safety management efforts in healthcare.        
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